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Future, judges and normalcy conditions
Alda MARI
Institut Jean Nicod / CNRS/ENS/EHESS
1. Introduction
Both early and recent work on modal expressions has been focused on the 
way their root and non-root interpretations correlate with the properties of the 
predicates with which they combine (see eg Bertinetto, 1979; Condoravdi, 
2001; Werner, 2006). Likewise, the temporal and the modal interpretations of 
the future have also been studied in correlation with the eventive versus 
stative distinction. This paper focuses on these distinctions in Italian (see in 
particular Bertinetto, ibid.; Berretta, 1997)
1
.
The ‘modal’ use of the future and the non-root interpretation of potere
and dovere are illustrated in (1b) and (2b). In this case, the property is (i) 
stative and (ii) its description is located at the utterance time. The ‘temporal’ 
reading for the future and the root interpretation of the modal potere and 
dovere are illustrated in (1a) and (2a) respectively. What these cases have in 
common, is that (i) the property is eventive and (ii) the event description is 
forward-shifted
2
. 
(1) a. Giovanni arriverà (TEMPORAL INTERPRETATION)
John will arrive
b. Giovanni discenderà da una famiglia nobile (MODAL INTERPRETATION)
John will descend from a noble family 
(2) a. Giovanni può arrivare / deve arrivare (ROOT/NON-ROOT)
John can/must arrive 
b. Giovanni può/deve discendere da una famiglia nobile (NON-ROOT)
John can/must descend from a noble family
Note that (2a) can also have a non-root interpretation and, in fact, as we are 
going to argue, (1a) can also have a modal interpretation. Nonetheless, let us 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Fabio del Prete, for bringing to my interest the question of 
future and for his helpful comments. Brenda Laca has also provided some precious 
suggestions. 
2 Note that (2a) can have a non-root interpretation as well; similarly, (1b) can have a 
root interpretation if ‘discenderà’ is under focus. 
assume, as a starting hypothesis, a correlation that translates at least a strong 
preference, using Condoravdi’s (2003) terms. 
(3) Eventive predicates obligatorily forward-shift the event description w.r.t. the 
utterance time; stative predicates do not. 
This correlation, and the intrinsic relation between the future and the 
modals, are at the core of this paper, the purpose of which is to present a 
revision of the principle (3) and a new explanation that answers the question 
of what conditions favor the forward shifting of event descriptions. The paper 
argues that (3) encodes tendency but cannot be considered a rule. It argues 
that forward-shifting is related to evidentiality, and occurs for reasons that are 
peculiar to the evidential mechanism. 
The main claims are that (i) synchronically the future is an evidential
marker that also signals that the event is non-past and (ii) the forward-
shifting of event descriptions (under some specific conditions) is due to the 
evidential nature of the future. 
Moreover, recent but robust observations across languages of different 
families have shown that (3) is at play not only with modals and future (e.g.
Bertinetto, 1979; Condoravdi, 2001; Werner, 2006) but also with if-clauses 
(Copley, 2006), and the Spanish subjunctive (Laca, 2008). The pattern is also 
observed in Italian (see (4) and (5)). The paper strongly suggests that the 
view elaborated here for the future, might be extended beyond it, and 
possibly to other contexts that appeal to an evidential mechanism. 
(4) a. Se si ammalaPRES, non viene
If he gets sick (in the future), he does not come 
b. Se sta malePRES,non viene 
If he is sick (now), he does not come 
(5) a. Credo che vengaPRES-subj
I believe that he comes (in the future)
b.Credo che sia malatoPRES-subj
I believe that he is sick (now)
Three sections follow. In Section 2, we discuss three views of the 
temporal / epistemic ambiguity of the future. In section 3 we present some 
pieces of new evidence. Section 4 is dedicated to our own account, and 
divided into two parts. In Section 4.1 we present the evidentiality mechanism, 
which is reminiscent of the work of Matthewson, Rullman and Davis (2006) 
(arguably assuming that evidentiality is a form of epistemicity). Specifically, 
the account will integrate indices to judges (Stephenson, 2006) and evidence-
based normalcy conditions. In Section 4.2 we explain the conditions under 
which eventive predicates forward-shift the event description, focusing on the 
mechanism for fixing the time of the event, starting from the unspecific 
instruction of the future as non-past. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
Terminologically, even if the modal interpretation of the future is 
essentially epistemic, we simply use the label ‘modal’. 
2. The modal and temporal uses of the future
In this section we consider three views of the modal/temporal distinction and 
their relation. We dedicate Section 2.1 to Bertinetto’s account, Section 2.2 to 
Bonomi and del Prete’s view and Section 2.3 to Condoravdi’s theory. 
2.1 Betinetto (1979)
We would like to begin our discussion of the use of the Italian future with the 
work of Bertinetto (1979), which, highlighting the strict relation between the 
future and epistemic/evidential dovere (must), and considering the 
complementary distribution of the meanings of the future depending on the 
properties of the predicate it combines with, already contains many of the 
ingredients that are found in the more recent literature. 
Two results of Bertinetto’s work are essential for us here. First, he states 
the correlation in (3). Second, he assigns to the future an essential modal 
component, arguing that the temporal is derived under particular conditions. 
We consider here the second point. The essential modal component of 
the future is shown to be of two natures, inferential (i.e. non-root use of the 
future is synonymous of dovere (must)) and conjectural (the future is also 
synonymous with potere (can)).  
(6) a. Giovanni si sbagliarà, ma non ne sono sicuro (= potere/can)
Giovanni might be  wrong, but I am not sure
b. Giovanni si sbaglierà, non c’è alcun dubbio (= dovere/must)
Giovanni might be wrong, there is no doubt
Bertinetto’s thesis is that the temporal component of the future is 
derived from its modal one. The argument is as follows. 
“Se l’impegno a fare qualcosa vale al momento dell’enunciazione, esso 
perdurerà fin tanto che l’azione stessa non è stata compiuta. Si deduce che, in 
mancanza di indizi contrari, per estrapolazione, l’azione sarà compiuta in un 
momento successivo a quello in cui l’enunciato viene prodotto » 
(Bertinetto,1979 :119). 
If the commitment to do something holds at the utterance time, it will hold 
insofar as the action has not yet been accomplished. One can infer by 
extrapolation, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the action will be 
accomplished in a moment succeeding that in which the utterance is produced. 
The core meaning of the future is then the actual commitment of the
speaker to accomplish an action (or to the realization of an event). Since the 
commitment holds at the time of the utterance it will hold until the event is 
realized. By ‘extrapolation,’ the realization of the action to which the speaker 
is committed is fixed to a future time.
Two ingredients are present in the explanation that Bertinetto provides for 
explaining the birth of the temporal use of the future: (i) the actual 
commitment to the realization of an event that extends until the event is 
realized, and (ii) the extrapolation procedure that fixes the occurrence of the 
event in the future. 
The author argues that the extrapolation procedure can be ‘blocked’ in 
two cases. First, by stative verbs, which “exclude any kind of modification of 
the actual state of affairs” (this would explain why forward-shifting is 
obtained with non-statives only). Second, it can be blocked when precise 
temporal indications are given. Bertinetto provides the following examples:
(7) In questo momento saranno le sì e no le 5 (Bertinetto, p. 77) (MODAL)
By now, it will be 5
(8) se continua così, tra dieci anni la lira varrà un decimo … (MODAL)
if things go on in the same way, in ten years the ‘lira’ will be worth a tenth of … 
The extrapolation procedure however, has to be abandoned since there 
are no clear conditions explicated for applying it (crucially, as we are going 
to show in Section 3, it is also blocked with non-statives in the lack of precise 
temporal indices; see infra). Instead, as is generally assumed in the more 
recent literature (see in particular Copley, 2002), the modal component of the 
account, (as in ‘impegno’ - ‘commitment’) is also at the core of our account. 
However, instead of ‘commitment’, our evidential account will endorse the 
notion of ‘guarantee’. This goes hand in hand with a peculiar view of 
normalcy conditions. 
2.2 Metaphysical and epistemic possibilities: Bonomi and del Prete
It is nowadays a common view that branching time is a suitable framework 
for talking about the future, with the timeline branching towards the future 
but not towards the past (Thomason, 1984; Benlap, 1992). 
Authors disagree essentially on the way one has to conceive the nature 
of the branches dividing at the utterance time. Under a non-deterministic 
view of the future (eg. Benlap and Green, 1994), they represent epistemic 
and metaphysical options. Under a deterministic view (eg. Lewis, 1986), 
theoreticians consider that the options are metaphysically closed but 
epistemically open and that branches only represent epistemic possibilities 
(see for a detailed discussion, McFarlane, 2006). 
A similar distinction has been discussed in a recent work on Italian 
future by Bonomi and del Prete (2008), who argue that, in Italian, the future 
can have both the non-deterministic use (‘wait and see interpretation’ (9b)) 
and the deterministic one (‘modalist interpretation’ (9a)). Roughly, these two 
interpretations correspond to the non-deterministic (or ‘actualist’) and 
deterministic (or ‘anteactualist’) view of future. 
(9) a. Secondo la tabella, il treno arriverà alle 6 (‘modalist’)
According to the schedule, the train will arrive at 6
b. Il dado cadrà sul 6 (‘wait and see’)
The die will come up 6
The treatment they provide is uniform and is based on the Priorian 
notion of settledness that they specify in two different manners for obtaining 
the two different interpretations. 
Interestingly for our purpose, the difference that they claim to exist 
between the two uses does not cut across different kinds of predicates, and 
the ‘modalist’ use is also compatible with eventive predicates (see (9a)). The 
difference that the authors see between these two cases is the following. In 
(9a), evidence is available for setting the issue once and for all. In other 
words, one can predict at tu what the future will be like and all the possible 
futures are alike (‘antactualist’ intuition). For (9b), there is no way to predict 
what the future will be like, and only one branch will realize it (‘actualist’
intuition). 
In order to distinguish between these two interpretations, the authors 
elaborate the priorian notion of settledness. According to the classical 
Priorian view of settledness a future sentence F(p) is true at a certain time t if 
and only if p turns out to be true at some time t1 > t in all courses of events 
compatible with the state of the world at t, i.e. no matter what the future at t is 
like. Assuming a representation of time as branching towards the future but 
t0, or tu
not towards the past, the Priorian notion of settledness can be considered as a 
universal quantification over the set of all possible futures, assuming the 
present state of the world. 
Bonomi and del Prete argue that the notion of settledness must be 
relativized to the context of use, and to a limited set of assumptions that are 
relevant to the evaluation of the sentence. Having said this, the ‘wait and see’ 
and the ‘modalist’ interpretation go as follows. 
(i) ‘wait and see’ : “… focus on the unique state of the world that happens to 
be actualized. From this point of view, settledness only obtains at the crucial 
time at which the relevant event occurs (or has no chance to occur anymore). 
This fact accounts for the intuition that, on its actualist interpretation, a future 
contingent has no truth value before this crucial time”. 
(ii) ‘modalist’: “… in order to obtain the modalist interpretation, we stick to 
the current assumptions, and check whether the truth or falsehood if the 
statement at issue is already settled with respect to them3 …”. 
There are two major problems. Firstly, like (9b), (9a) cannot be valuated 
as true or false until the moment when the train leaves. Compared to (9b), the 
prediction is based on ‘objective’ evidence, but the issue is also not settled 
until departure time of the train. 
Secondly, using (9b) speakers show a certain degree of confidence on 
what the future will be like. Following Condoravdi (2001), we recognize that, 
as for the use of the English will, when using the Italian future, speakers 
behave like antactualists. In particular, (9b) cannot be continued with ‘but I 
am not sure’. 
(10) Il dado cadrà sul 6 #ma non ne sono sicuro
The die will come up six, #but I am not sure
In the lack of objective evidence, speakers commit themselves to the 
truth of their assertion on the basis of ‘subjective’ evidence (see von Fintel 
and Gillies, 2008)
4
. 
Together these two observations lead us to the following conclusion. 
The difference between (9a) and (9b) is not between two uses of the future. 
They only appeal to two different types of evidence. The ‘modalist’ and the 
‘wait and see’ interpretation of Bonomi and del Prete illustrated in (9) are 
two cases of the temporal use of the future. 
                                                          
3 Note that contrary to the deterministic view à la Lewis, the ‘modalist’ interpretation 
does not leave any room to epistemic uncertainty. 
4 Note that one can felicitously utter : According to the schedule the train will leave at 
4 but I am not sure. This is because two sources of evidences are being contrasted. 
2.3 Condoravdi’s view
While Condoravdi (2001) recognizes that English speakers behave like 
antactualist, she spouses the non-deterministic view to start with. She 
crucially integrates information coming from the predicate in an interesting 
way. 
Building on the assumption that future will has a modal and a temporal 
interpretation, she argues that either one is selected according as to whether 
reference to a future time is made possible by the semantics of the predicate. 
Condoravdi explicitly proposes the correlation in (3). 
In order to derive the predictions, the author needs to state a diversity 
condition.
(10) Diversity condition: the modal basis must contain p and not p
If the event is located at a time t1 > t0, since time metaphysically 
branches at t0, the diversity condition is metaphysically satisfied. In this case, 
different branches host p and not p. Moreover, the author assumes that 
metaphysical diversity is also epistemic diversity (a claim that we are going 
to challenge). Consequently, if the event is located at t1 > t0, metaphysical 
and epistemic diversity are met. On the other hand, if the event is located at 
the utterance time, only the epistemic reading is allowed. In this case one 
considers the multiplication of worlds at the utterance time, hosting p and not 
p. 
Since eventive predicates, by assumption, forward-shift the event 
description, they allow metaphysiscal and epistemic diversity (temporal 
reading of the future). Since, by assumption, stative predicates locate the 
event at the utterance time, the metaphysical possibilities are closed and the 
epistemic reading is the only one available.
The generalization goes beyond the future tense and Condoravdi states 
that modals for the present (like, eg may, might, ….) have a future orientation 
optionally with stative predicates and obligatorily with eventive predicates.
This is certainly the most comprehensive account of the interaction 
between the meaning of the future (and existential modals) and the stative vs. 
eventive nature of the properties. The major shortcoming for applying it to 
the Italian future is presented by an unexplained set of data that will be 
discussed in the next section. The main conclusion we draw from this set of 
data is that the distinction at play for fixing the time of the event is not simply 
between eventive and non-eventive predicates, and that this distinction only 
reveals a preference (which we are going to explain). We are going to show, 
in fact, that both eventive and non-eventive predicates can have a modal and 
a temporal interpretation, and that the two interpretations are triggered on the 
basis of an evidential mechanism.
3. New pieces of evidence. 
The assumption that the modal interpretation is facultative with stative 
predicates (see the pattern in (1)), whereas the temporal reading is mandatory 
with eventives, must be refined (a different view has also been presented by 
Laca (2008), to which we return in Section 5.2). 
There are at least two contexts in which an eventive predicate can be 
used in the future tense with a modal interpretation and without forward-
shifting. 
1. Habitual contexts. Assume a scenario in which my husband and I are 
talking about our son who is at school, where activities are carefully 
scheduled. The meal, in particular is always at 11:30 am. At 11:30 am, I ask
(12A) 
(11) A Che cosa farà? 
What will he do? 
B: Mangerà (MODAL)
He will eat 
(11B) is a modal use of the future, which is perfectly allowed. Note that 
the time is not fixed by an adverb. 
2. A second context in which the modal use of eventive predicates is 
allowed, is in the presence of clues. Consider a scenario in which there is 
noise outside. To the question (12A), B can reply (12B). 
(12) A: Che cosa succede? 
What is going on? 
B: Arriverà Giovanni
Giovanni might arrive
This example has been independently noted by Rocci (forthcoming). 
However, the way he interprets it is that the modal interpretation is allowed if 
one can recover the preparatory phase of the accomplishment. This is going 
to become relevant in some respect. However, what seems to be crucial is the 
presence of clues in the context. 
A general observation that it is important to emphasize is that the future 
tense is compatible with interpretations as describing events both at the time 
of utterance and at a time in the future w.r.t. the utterance time. While in the 
second case (13b) only forward-shifting is trivially made available by the 
adverb, in the first case, if is there is evidence available (or the context is 
habitual in the sense described above), the modal reading can be obtained. In 
the absence of such evidence, forward shifting in the very immediate future is 
obtained in (13a). 
(13) a. Piero arriverà ora
Piero will arrive now
b. Piero arriverà domani
Piero will arrive tomorrow
When the event description coincides with the utterance time, no matter 
whether the predicate is eventive or stative, the only reading is epistemic.
This observation leads us to revise (3). Eventive predicates do not 
necessarily forward shift the event description.
To conclude, there is nothing in the future tense that locates the event at 
a time in the future w.r.t. the utterance time (this is a general property of 
modals for the future (see e.g. Condoravdi, 2001)). The questions to be 
answered are (i) why the modal (epistemic) reading obtains when the event 
description is located at t0 (the time of utterance) while it does not when it is 
located at t1 > t0, (ii) under what conditions t0 or t1 is chosen. 
Our claim is that synchronically, the future contributes a modal 
(evidential) meaning and locates the event at a time coincident with or later 
than the utterance time (it is essentially a non-past tense). 
Our answer to the question of the conditions under which event 
descriptions are forward-shifted is that this is observed when the basic 
evidential mechanism has to be saved (unless explicit temporal adverbs are 
present, locating the event at a t1 > t0). 
The next section is dedicated to our analysis. 
4. Towards a new analysis 
This section is dedicated to the presentation of a new analysis of the future in 
Italian. We consider two issues in turn: its evidential meaning component 
(Section 4.1) and then a strategy for fixing the time of the event (Section 4.2) 
starting from the unspecified instruction that the reference is non-past. 
4.1. Future as evidential (but what is an evidential?)
The idea that the future is a modal is generally accompanied by the 
assumption that it is a special type of modal, namely an evidential. Assuming 
that an expression of evidentiality specifies the sources that the speaker relies 
on to make his assertion reliably, the future is generally taken to mark some 
kind of inference. This was also the main insight in the work of Bertinetto 
(1979), and I think this is correct (see for recent work in the same direction, 
Matthewson, Rullman and Davis, forthcoming; Rocci, forthcoming). 
It is much less clear, however, whether evidentials are ordinary 
epistemics or a special kind of epistemics and, in the latter case, what the 
difference is (see von Fintel and Gillies, 2007; de Haan, 1998; Matthewson et 
al. forthcoming, among many others). Here we start with the view of 
Matthewson et al., also focusing on the so-called disparity principle
(Condoravdi, 2001; Werner, 2006) and normalcy conditions (Dowty, 1979; 
Copley, 2002 for old and new discussions, among many others). The major 
point of the revision is to reintroduce a notion of stereotypicality and to 
relativize it to a judge (Stephenson, 2006) in order to capture the 
“(un)certainty” associated with evidential claims. The understanding that we 
propose is different from the standard view (Kratzer, 1991) and its extension 
to future modal sentences (Werner, 2006). 
In Section 4.1.1 we consider the semantics and pragmatics concerning 
the sources of the (alleged) weakness of epistemic modals. Our purpose in 
the subsequent sections is to recast the pragmatic view in semantic terms. To 
achieve this we present the analysis of Matthewson et al. of evidentials in 
Section 4.1.2, and then our own account, in which we elaborate on the 
standard notion of normalcy conditions, in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1 The diversity principle and evidentiality
Following Condoravdi (2001), Werner (2006) has explicitly argued that 
modals come in the language with a diversity principle (which can be 
blocked under specific constraints, which are not relevant here). There is a 
long standing debate, though, on the sources of this diversity, and whether 
there is really a diversity condition at play. 
The idea though goes back to Kartunnen (1972), who writes that when 
uttering a modalized statement the speaker is making a claim weaker than 
that he would make with a non modalized one. Uttering (17), the speaker 
does not know whether John is asleep. In order to obtain this, Werner 
elaborates on a notion that was already present in Kratzer’s (1981) account. 
The idea is that the meaning of (14) is that John is asleep in the worlds closer 
to the ideal, but not in all worlds of the modal basis. 
(14) John must be asleep
Werner argues in favor of a semantic view, and elaborates a diversity 
condition stating that (i) the intersection between the modal basis and the 
proposition that John is asleep is not empty, but that (ii) the intersection 
between the modal basis and the proposition that John is asleep is also 
different from the modal basis itself. 
A counterargument to Kartunnen’s view has been recently proposed by 
von Fintel and Gillies (2007), who propose a pragmatic view. The authors 
argue that the apparent weakness of the modal (epistemic) is due to its 
evidential nature: the utterance is not based on direct observation/experience 
but on deduction. The author’s claim is based on (15), which shows that there 
is no weakness in the conclusion (15c). 
(15) a. The ball is in A, in B or in C
b. It neither in A nor in B
c. It must be in C
They choose a speech act analysis based on parentheticals, which also 
echoes typological findings presented and discussed in de Haan (1998). If 
any, the uncertainty flavor of the modal derives from the fact that the 
statement is based on a deduction and not on direct evidence. 
As a further example let us consider the case in which one is about to 
eat a kiwi. It is green and of a good consistency. (16) can be uttered 
felicitously. This sentence is no longer felicitous after the person has eaten 
the kiwi, that is to say, once she has acquired direct (relevant) evidence for 
asserting that it tastes good. 
(16) The kiwi must be good (Fabienne Martin, p.c.)
In what follows, we try to cast this view into a semantic framework, 
elaborating on the notion of stereotypicality conditions. In particular, what 
we want to code in the semantics is that the worlds in which the evidence 
leads to the conclusion that the proposition expressed by the future sentence 
is true, are normal for a judge. The evidence could also have led to a different 
conclusion. However, the worlds where this happens are less normal worlds
for that judge. This translates the idea that the evidence is not direct, and 
contains in itself a certain degree of uncertainty (since it does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that p). 
To conclude the discussion, we motivate the diversity principle in 
evidential terms. 
(17) The future as evidential requires that the modal base contains p and not p since 
the evidence on which it relies is not sufficient to ascertain p with certainty.   
In other terms there are worlds in which the evidence v holds and p
holds, and there are other worlds in which the evidence v holds but p does 
not. 
Anticipating what is to come, let us briefly state our position. Common 
wisdom about epistemic modals (Kratzer, 1991) is that one must distinguish 
between two ingredients: the modal base and the ordering source. 
Epistemic modals are defined for (i) a modal base that contains all those 
worlds in which the speaker’s beliefs hold (‘in view of the available 
evidence’) and (ii) an ordering source that induces an order over the worlds 
of the modal base according to stereotypicality (‘in view of the normal course 
of events’). 
The now classical view of existential / universal epistemic modality tell 
us that a proposition p is true in w if and only if it is true in some / all worlds 
accessible from w in the modal base in which the ‘available evidence’ holds. 
The stereotypicality condition adds that this is the case in the worlds that are 
the most similar to w (in essence this remains the view of Werner, 2006).  
In a recent work, Matthewson Rullman and Davis (forthcoming) have 
shown major similarities between evidentials and modals, and also adapt 
Kratzer’s view for the analysis of St’at’imcet modals (and evidentials). 
We add a constraint on the stereotypicality conditions that we relativize 
to the evidence and to a judge. We want to capture in fact that the claim is not 
certain because the evidence is indirect, that is to say, it can be interpreted in 
different ways. Uncertainty is not due to the fact that some worlds are less 
stereotypical, but to the fact that the same evidence can lead different judges 
to different conclusions. This is particularly salient for the future which 
prefers not only indirect but non-authoritative evidence (see discussion in 
Section 5). 
4.1.2 Future as evidential: previous accounts of evidentiality
In this section, we are going to present our analysis, starting with the work of 
Matthewson et al. Since the theoretical choices are important for our own 
account, let us recall the steps of their analysis. 
Matthewson et al. adopt Klinedinst’s view that possibility modals 
existentially quantify over pluralities of worlds (in the same way as plural 
indefinites quantify over pluralities of entities). The individual worlds that 
belong to the existentially quantified plurality of worlds are then universally
quantified. Under this assumption, the analysis is as follows:
(18) Modal p is true with respect to a modal base B and a possible world w iff
W [WB(w)  W    (w’  W  p(w’))
The modal base is contextually provided in view of the ‘available 
evidence,’ and contains all worlds accessible from w in which p is true. 
Matthewson et al. extend this analysis to all evidential modals, and 
restate it as follows. Interpreted with respect to an context of utterance c and 
a world w: 
(19) [[Modal]]c,w is only defined if c provides a modal base B. 
If defined, [[Modal]]c,w = f<st,st>.p<s,t>.w’[w’  f(B(w))  p(w’)]
The modal base B maps the evaluation world w into the set of worlds 
that are accessible from it. The choice function f picks a subset of B. f is a 
free variable whose value is determined by the context. Specific lexical items 
impose specific restrictions on the modal base. A restricted modal basis cut 
off by hearsay, for instance, contains all those worlds in which what is hear-
said holds.
In what follows, we will stick to (18), also using it for evidentials like 
the Italian future. Let us emphasize from the outset that (18) allows the
existence of worlds of the modal base in which the evidence holds but p is 
not true. 
4.1.3 Future as evidential: refining the account
Assume that we paraphrase a modal future sentence as in (20), where the 
inference is based on the evidence that Mario is not at the location where the 
utterance takes place. As starting hypothesis, we consider rewriting the future 
sentence as a sentence in the present tense plus an evidential marker. 
(20) Mario sarà malato  Marion è INF malato 
Mario might be sick (paraphrased as) Mario is INF sick 
Applied to (20), the analysis of evidential INF in (18) implies that the 
proposition that Mario is ill is true in w, iff there is a subset of worlds of the 
modal basis accessible from w such that the proposition that Mario is ill is 
true. 
Note that it is not determined whether the world w is or is not in this set 
of worlds. 
We want to capture the fact that the worlds in which the evidence that a 
person is absent means, to a particular judge, that the person is ill, are more 
normal than those in which the evidence that a person is absent means 
something else (in particular, that he is not ill). 
This, according to our view, is the source of the high degree of certainty 
(because the worlds in which being absent means being ill are more normal
to a judge), but also the weakness of the statement (since there are less 
normal worlds in which being absent does not mean being ill). 
Our purpose is to translate this into a semantic notion, a task that we can 
achieve if we slightly modify the classical claim about stereotypicality 
conditions and introduce a notion of reliability on the basis of the evidence
for a judge. 
Assume that the context provides the modal basis W’ which contains all 
accessible worlds in which the evidence holds (Mario is absent). What we 
want to state is that in these worlds where Mario is observed not to be there, 
the proposition that Mario is ill is true and this is the case because the 
evidence is reliable for this conclusion for a particular judge.  
The analysis is the following. For a set of worlds W in which the 
evidence holds, a judge i and an accessibility relation R, at the utterance time 
t0, a future sentence is true at w in context c iff
5
(21) W’  W  t ((t  [t0, [ )  w’  W’, w’Rw & w’ are the most normal 
according to the sources of evidence available to i) p(w’, t)
Here, the normality conditions force one to consider the set of worlds 
quantified over as being more normal than its complement in the modal 
basis, which can also contain the propositions associated to the evidence. 
Let us come back to the case of Mario whose absence leads to the 
conclusion that he is ill. There are (at least) two subsets of worlds in the 
modal basis: one set such that it is true both that Mario is absent and that he 
is ill, and another set in which Mario is absent but he is not ill (e.g. he is at 
the bar). In all worlds in the first subset, Mario is absent and he is sick. Note 
that the two sets of worlds are equally normal, ‘objectively speaking’. 
However, a certain conclusion (i.e. that p is the case) is ‘more normal’ for a 
given judge (the judge knows Mario’s habits, character and so on ...).  
Under this view, we can capture at the same time the fact that the 
speaker reliably ascertains that Mario is sick (because he knows his own
normality conditions associated to the evidence), while being aware that the 
evidence does not incontestably lead to this conclusion, i.e. the evidence is 
not direct. 
The judge parameter then plays a major role in relativizing the 
normality of the evidence, and also plays a role in explaining synchronically 
a variety of uses of the future. 
It is a very well described fact (see, in particular, Berretta, 1997) that the 
Italian future has a wide variety of modal interpretations. In particular it has a 
concessive and a performative use. 
(22) a. Saro stupido, ma non capisco questa teoria
I will be stupid, but I do not understand this theory
b. Questa funzione si chiamerà crescente
This function will be called increasing
                                                          
5 We denote by [t0, [ an interval that starts at the utterance time t0 and is unbounded 
in the forward direction.
These uses can be uniformly captured if one explicitly integrates the 
judge parameter into the analysis. While by default the parameter is linked to 
the speaker, the concessive reading can be obtained if it is linked to the 
hearer, and the performative if the judge is the audience (including the 
speaker and the hearer). Different meanings then turn out to be variations of a 
unique schema rather than derived from each other (contra Berretta, 1997). 
Before concluding the section, and in order to further spell out the 
claim, a comparison with the recent work of Copley (2008) on the futurate in 
English might be useful. In her account of the futurate in English (see (23a);
this construction is lacking in Italian), the author has argued that the futurate 
event is realized in the metaphysical modal base if the speaker is committed 
to its realization at a future time t1 > t0 in a subset of the worlds of the 
metaphysical modal base (namely a subset of worlds in which his 
commitment holds), ceteris paribus. 
This view resembles Bertinetto’s account of the future under 
commitment, and the notion of commitment has also been defended by 
Kissine (2008). 
However, the notion of commitment seems too strong to be adopted 
here. The notion of commitment has been arguably used by Copley to tease
apart cases in which the agent can control and cannot control the action.
(23) a. The Yankees are playing the Reds tomorrow
b. ?? The Yankees are defeating the Reds tomorrow
Commitment is a sub-ingredient of a plan. Since the Italian future 
version of (23b) is perfectly fine (Gli Yankees batteranno i Red, domani), in 
which a plan is lacking, a weaker notion is needed. As all the above 
mentioned examples show, there is not necessarily a plan involved in the use 
of the future and the notion of commitment turns out to be too strong. 
‘inference according to one’s own interpretation of the evidence’ seems 
sufficient. 
A second difference between the two accounts lies in the notion of 
normalcy conditions. Copley’s view is that speaker commitment holds 
insofar as the circumstances are as usual (i.e. in the absence of a meteorite
falling on earth, or similar improbable circumstances). Our account states 
instead that ‘normality’ is to relativize to the way a judge interprets the 
evidence. Being normal according to a judge in view of a certain set of 
evidence means that a world in which the evidence holds and which satisfies 
the proposition p is more normal for that judge than the other worlds, in 
which the evidence holds and p is not verified. 
Finally, The account we have provided of the future does not involve 
explicit reference to a future time, but, in view of the data discussed in 
Section 3, we have considered that the future marks the event as non-past, 
and that forward-shifting obtains in particular circumstances. 
Up to this point, the account predicts that when the valuation of a future 
sentence is carried out at the utterance time, only the modal interpretation is 
available. In the next section we consider the mechanisms that lead to 
forward-shifting and to the temporal reading of the future. 
4.2. Setting the time
Now that we have explored the evidential nature of the future, we must 
come back to the issue of the time at which the event occurs. We have noted 
that the initial generalization in (3) is not faithful to the data, since there are 
cases in which the predicate is eventive but its description is not forward-
shifted. There are three options. To begin with, the difference between (24a) 
and (24b) argues in favor of the fact that the event is forward-shifted thanks 
to the adverb that locates the event description in one of the branches
dividing at t0. 
(24) a. Arriverà ora (MODAL/TEMPORAL)
He will arrive now
b. Arriverà domani (TEMPORAL)
He will arrive tomorrow
c. Arriverà (MODAL/TEMPORAL)
He will arrive
The analysis obtained for (24b) is given in (25). For a modal base W in 
which evidence holds, a future sentence is true at an utterance time t0 and 
with respect to a judge i iff 
(25) W’  W  t0 < t1 (w’  W’, w’Rw & w’ are the most normal for a judge 
according to the evidence ) p(w’, t1)
(25) states that in some of the worlds in which the evidence holds, and 
which are considered as the most normal by the judge, there is a time t1 > t0 at 
which the event is realized (namely tomorrow). Without further exploring the 
issue of time adverbials, we want to suggest, contrary to what determinists 
would claim and also differently from e.g. Condoravdi (2003), that a future 
sentence with forward-shifting time adverbs presents the options as 
epistemically closed, but metaphysically open. 
In essence, this analysis applies the temporal reading of (24c), and we 
now consider the conditions for setting the event description at t0 or at t1 > t0 
when an overt adverbial is lacking. 
Our claim is that in the absence of an overt adverbial, the description of 
an eventive predicate can be set at t0 if and only if there is evidence for doing 
so. 
Starting with non-statives, two options must be distinguished: (i) cases 
in which evidence is available, and (ii) those in which it is not. 
Under the first option, one can include cases (11B) and (12B). As 
discussed above, there is some evidence that allows the speaker to reliably 
predict that the person in question is having lunch (11B) or is arriving (12B). 
In the case of habituals (11B), the indirect evidence is provided by knowing a 
schedule. Knowing at what times the activities take place, and knowing what 
the time of the utterance is, it is possible to conclude that a certain activity is 
very likely taking place. Similarly, recognizing some noise in the entry 
(12B), allows one to reliably conclude that somebody is arriving. Again, the 
evidence is considered to be reliable for a judge, that is to say, the worlds in 
which the evidence is the noise in the entry, and which behave normally 
w.r.t. the evidence for a judge, are also worlds in which that judge can 
conclude that somebody is entering. 
Why should evidence play any role in determining the time to which the 
description is located? Or, why, in (24c), does the lack of evidence only lead 
to a temporal interpretation? 
Our answer is that since by using the future the speaker asserts that a 
certain event is (very) likely to occur (according to a source of evidence), she 
can reliably guarantee that a punctual event occurs exactly at the time of the 
utterance only if she has evidence for this, as when talking about habits 
(11B) and when clues are available (the noise justifies (12B)). 
Forward-shifting the event description thus becomes a reinforcement of 
evidential strategy. The speaker can guarantee with a higher degree of 
reliability the occurrence of the event by placing it in the future and 
quantifying over normal futures, rather than betting that a punctual, 
unscheduled, time-undetermined event is taking place exactly at the time of 
the assertion. 
Interestingly for our purpose, Laca (2008) has argued that in Romance 
languages forward-shifting is obtained with telic events, and can be obtained 
with atelic ones. Provided that the evidentiality conditions are satisfied, the 
same holds in Italian. 
Stretching the unbounded end so as to cover the utterance time, allows 
the speaker to guarantee more reliably that the event might take place at tu. 
With a bounded event, s/he should make sure that the utterance time is 
strictly contained within the boundaries. Postponing the description of the 
events leaves the options open. 
Again, since it is unlikely that a bounded, unscheduled event occurs 
exactly at the utterance time, forward-shifting allows the speaker to guarantee 
its realization with a higher degree of certainty: if located at a future time t1, 
it is still an option at t0 that the event is realized, and the most normal set of 
possible futures for i is the one in which it is realized.
As for statives, the situation is different. Since statives and more 
generally predicates denoting an unbounded interval describe an event which 
presumably covers the utterance time, the modal interpretation is favored. 
Note though that contextual information or a time adverb can set the 
beginning of a state at a time t1 > t0. In this case the interpretation is temporal. 
In conclusion, there is then no reason to distinguish between eventive 
and stative predicates. Both can have a temporal and a modal interpretation, 
provided that evidence is available to the judge to guarantee that the event 
takes place exactly at the utterance time. In the lack of any overt 
specification, statives have a preference for the modal interpretation since the 
event description presumably holds at the utterance time; non-statives favor a 
temporal interpretation since, in the lack of any evidence, it is a priori
unlikely that an unscheduled bounded event occurs at the utterance time. 
Note that no diversity condition is needed since diversity follows from the 
evidential analysis. 
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a view in which the future contributes (i) 
non-past and (ii) evidential meaning components. We have argued that while 
the nature of the predicate contributes to fixing the temporal reference, the 
generalization in (3) only reveals a preference, since in some conditions 
eventive predicates (and, more precisely, bounded events) are not forward-
shifted. Instead, we have proposed that, in the lack of overt temporal 
adverbials, the evidential mechanism is responsible for the forward-shifting,
and that this occurs when one has no reason to believe that a bounded, 
unscheduled event takes place exactly at the utterance time. We would like to 
suggest that the same view can be held for (at least) attitude verbs. 
A question that remains open at this point is the nature of the inference 
involved in the use of the future. In particular, it is not clear why we cannot 
get an epistemic reading for (26), with the event description set at the 
utterance time. 
(26) Secondo la tabella il treno partirà (*MODAL EPISTEMIC)
According to the schedule the train will leave
Our suggestion is that the epistemic future is incompatible with non-
inferential evidence, and is independent of the eventive/stative nature of the 
predicate. 
(27) Secondo il dottore, Mario sarà malato (*MODAL EPISTEMIC)
According to the doctor, Mario will be sick 
The investigation of the sources allowing the inference to be drawn
remains to be undertaken.  
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